SECOND DIVISION
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HEIRS OF
BASILISA HERNANDEZ, herein represented by their Attorney-in-fact ROSA H.
FENIQUITO, Petitioners, - versus - BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 166975 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA,
and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
In an action for ejectment filed by the
petitioners against the respondent, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 8, and later, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, are one
in ordering the respondent’s ejectment from the premises involved in the suit
and the latter's payment of attorney’s fees and costs. The Court of Appeals (CA), in its Decision[1]
dated
The undisputed facts:
Basilisa Hernandez (Basilisa, for
brevity), now deceased, was the owner of a property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 94128 and located at No. 1110 Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz,
On
In his Answer, Bernardo denied that
his possession of the property was by mere tolerance, claiming that he became
the owner thereof by virtue of a “donation
inter vivos” executed by Basilisa in his favor. He alleged that Basilisa
voluntarily took him under her care when he was just a few months old, and has ever
since treated him as her very own son.
He further alleged that Basilisa, during her lifetime, openly
represented herself to be his mother. The
deed of donation was allegedly executed when Bernardo was only five years old,
and his father accepted it in his behalf.
This was the basis of his claim to the continued possession of the
subject property.
In a decision[3]
dated
Thus after the demise of the said Basilisa Hernandez, plaintiff’s act of demanding from the defendant that he and his assigns vacate the property, was within her prerogative, as an heir of the former. From then on, defendant’s possession of the property became unlawful. Possession of a possessor by mere tolerance becomes unlawful the moment the owner demand[s] that he vacate the land,
and
accordingly rendered judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter and all other persons claiming right of possession under him to:
a. Vacate the premises known as
b. Pay the plaintiff the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as and for attorney’s fees and P2,000.00
for every court appearance[;]
c. Pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
On Bernardo’s appeal to the RTC of
Manila, Branch 20 thereof, in its decision[4] of
September 10, 2003, affirmed en toto that
of the MeTC, reasoning out that the
only issue in ejectment cases is the physical or material possession and who is
entitled thereto, notwithstanding any claim of ownership set forth by any of
the party-litigants.
Obviously dissatisfied, Bernardo
elevated the case to the CA in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80461. This time, Bernardo
prevailed. For, in a Decision[5]
dated
x x x the case at bench presents a more fundamental issue, that is, the question of de facto possession cannot be determined properly without settling the issue of ownership because the latter is inseparably linked with the former, a situation where the question of possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that the question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This is because an action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature. It is a proceeding inadequate for the ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted property. It is more in keeping with the summary nature of ejectment cases that when issues of title and ownership are inextricably related to physical/material possession, said unlawful detainer case should be dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court for being an improper remedy. x x x.
x x x It should be noted that the Metropolitan Trial Court did not receive evidence as regards the issue of ownership, such that there was no determination, albeit provisional, of the issue of ownership for purposes of resolving the issue of possession. This is so because the true issue for resolution in this case is not simply who between the parties is entitled to physical possession of the property. Rather, this case involves the determination of the issue of possession de jure, considering that the claim of each party is hinged on their respective claims of ownership, [respondent] as donee, and [petitioners] as heirs of Basilia (sic) Hernandez. x x x the proper remedy is an accion reinvindicatoria, which should be brought in the proper court, depending upon the value of the subject property, under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. x x x.
x x
x x x x x x x
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of the
Metropolitan Trial Court dated
SO ORDERED.
With their motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the CA in its affirmatory Resolution of
ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP BY THE DEFENDANT IN AN EJECTMENT CASE DOES NOT DIVEST THE MTC OF JURISDICTION IN AN EJECTMENT CASE EVEN IF THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP IS CLOSELY INTERTWINED WITH THE QUESTION OF POSSESSION.
CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS IN THE ASSAILED DECISION, THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT RESOLVED THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO POSSESSION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
THE RULING IN THE CASE OF SERDONCILLO VS. BENOLIRAO WAS MISAPPRECIATED IN THE ASSAILED DECISION.
We GRANT the petition.
While we are in accord with the CA in ruling that the only issue for
resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party litigants,[7] we
disagree, however, with its conclusion that the MeTC is divested of
jurisdiction in this case because the issue of ownership which is so
intertwined with the issue of possession, was raised by the respondent in his Answer.
In Garcia vs. Zosa, Jr.,[8] this
matter is clearly explained, to wit:
The
fundamental issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the MTC has
jurisdiction over the forcible entry case.
Section
33 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides:
“SEC.
33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the issue of ownership
shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession;”
This
provision should be read in light of Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:
“SEC.
18. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive in actions
involving title or ownership. – The judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title to the land or building.
The
judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.”
We
have ruled that all ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the courts mentioned in
Section 33 (above quoted) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, regardless of
whether said cases involve questions of ownership, or even if the issue of
possession cannot be determined without resolving the question of ownership.
The judgment of the inferior court,
however, on the question of ownership is of a provisional nature and shall be
for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession. It shall not bind the title of the realty or
affect the ownership thereof nor shall it bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the real property. Verily, we hold that the
Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 2728 for
forcible entry, notwithstanding the issue of ownership raised by petitioner in
her answer. (Emphasis supplied.)
That the MeTC has jurisdiction even in
cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership is now a settled doctrine in ejectment proceedings. The CA, therefore, erred when it ruled otherwise.
On this score alone, the appellate court’s decision merits complete reversal.
Moreover, the CA’s citation of the
case of Sedoncillo vs. Benolirao,[9] and
its reliance on the ruling of Refugia vs.
Court of Appeals,[10]
are utterly misplaced.
In Refugia, we held:
After due deliberation, we find
and so hold that by virtue of the express mandate set forth in Section 33(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior
courts have jurisdiction to resolve the question of ownership raised as an
incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof
is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession. Certain guidelines, however, must be observed
in the implementation of this legislative prescription, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
2. It must sufficiently appear from the
allegations in the complaint that what the
plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of the
complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the
recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the recovery of possession de
facto, or where the averments plead the claim of material possession as a
mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where the issue of
ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for
forcible entry but one for title to real property.
Clearly, what the petitioners seek in
the ejectment suit they filed before the MeTC is to recover possession of the
property they inherited from their sister Basilisa, from Bernardo who holds the
same by mere tolerance. There is
absolutely no showing that the allegations of the complaint and the prayer
therein embodied establish a case for the recovery of ownership. For sure, the issue of ownership was only
raised by Bernardo himself in his Answer. In other words, there is nothing in the
allegations of the complaint or in its prayer, contrary to what the CA wants to
make it appear, that attempts to recover ownership of the subject property from
Bernardo, who, according to the complaint, was only a possessor by mere
tolerance. The CA’s conclusion that the
action filed before the MeTC of Manila was an accion reinvindicatoria is without any factual or legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution
of the CA are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the reversed MeTC and RTC
decisions dated
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari
D. Carandang, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina
Arevalo-Zenaroza, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 7-12.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Supra note 2.
[7] Boy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125088,
[8] G.R. No. 138380,
[9] G.R. No. 118328,
[10] 327 Phil. 982 (1996).